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ABSTRACT 
New trends in inter-organization configurations are challenging the 
traditional concept of supply chain. Concepts such as Virtual Enterprise 
were introduced to describe scenarios in which manufacturers operate as 
nodes within a network of suppliers, customers, engineers, and other 
specialized service functions. Our aim is to build a simulation tool based on 
the rules of the Beer Game that includes the variables of a virtual enterprise, 
VirtuE in particular, and risk management in order to understand the 
strategies underlying the subject’s behavior in the face of risk within a 
means-end chain. The simulation tool will contribute to understanding the 
complexity of managing decision making in supply chains and networks. 
This study presents the tests carried out on the original game, the new 
variables introduced, and the simulation results
b
. 
Keywords: Beer Game, Virtual Enterprises, Transaction Costs, Supply 
Chain Management 
                                                 
a
 This article is based on the previous work presented at the 13th IFAC Symposium on 
Information Control Problems in Manufacturing
1
. 
b
 We thank all the partners of the SFIDA PMI project. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Beer Game was developed in the 1960s by the MIT Sloan System 
Dynamics Group
2, 3
 as a didactic tool to simulate information and material 
flows along the supply chain from the factory to the retailer. The main goal 
of this business game is to show the existence and the characteristics of the 
“bullwhip effect”4, 5. This phenomenon represents the propagation and 
amplification of orders as they pass upstream in a supply chain pipeline. It 
causes uncertainty for managers who then create stock and/or maintain 
excess capacity leading to increased total costs. The Beer Game has been 
widely used to simulate the “bullwhip” effect but also other phenomena 
such as the “backlash” effect or reflection of shipments in response to 
amplification in orders
5
. 
The Beer Game has four players: retailer, wholesaler, distributor, and 
factory. These players are distributed along a single supply chain, 
communicating with each other only about the beer orders that each player 
sends to the nearest player. The only exception refers to the retailer’s order, 
represented by the requests of the final customer, which is established in 
advance and are not known by other participants. 
Many questions have been posed about the limitations of the original 
Beer Game (for convenience, we will refer to it as the “MIT Beer Game”), 
and new versions have been proposed. Kaminsky and Simchi-Levi
6
 
highlighted the limits of the Beer Game in providing a better way to manage 
the supply chain. They also highlighted that the game structure does not 
provide a realistic view of the behaviors involved in the supply chain. 
Indeed, a linear chain does not allow any choice about the suppliers. 
Kimbrough et al.
7
 described players’ behavior when they join the supply 
chain. In their view, players are not motivated to share information; their 
choices are taken in situations of bounded rationality, and their individual 
rational behavior sometimes goes against the group’s interests. These and 
other critics
8
 gave rise to a number of digital versions of the MIT Beer 
Game or similar tools
9
 that take into account the variables involved. For 
instance, in order to introduce the concept of optimization, Kumara et al. 
proposed a new version of the Beer Game in which a single player (acting as 
supply chain coordinator) sets the model parameters and the model is 
executed in a probabilistic manner
10
. Furthermore, a recent work underlines 
the importance to consider that decision makers evaluate the prospects for 
gains and losses from psychological reference points that shift over time 
following some random events instead of seeking to maximize their utility 
under an unvarying formula
11
. 
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Other studies concentrate more on the structural and topological 
aspects of the Beer Game by stressing the fact that the supply chain evolves 
into network solutions based on collaborative and communicative 
interactions between two or more enterprises and oriented towards the 
coordination of different activities
3, 8, 13, 14
. Indeed, companies abandoned 
the perspective that each supply chain member performs a distinct 
value-adding task and instead regard both suppliers and customers as 
potential co-producers of value
15
. These trends in inter-organization 
configurations led to the concept of Virtual Enterprise to characterize the 
global supply chain of a single product in an environment of dynamic 
networks between companies engaged in many different complex 
relationships. In a Virtual Enterprise (VE), manufacturers no longer produce 
complete products in isolated facilities. They operate as nodes in a network 
of suppliers, customers, engineers, and other specialized service functions
16, 
17, 18
. In such contexts, transaction costs are a key issue to be taken into 
account
19, 20
, and some formal representation has been proposed in the 
literature for modeling issues such as transaction costs and risks in the 
VirtuE model
21
.  
In order to introduce the students to various supply chain management 
topics arising from these structural aspects, a new version of the game was 
proposed by Riemer as a teaching tool for extending the initial version
22
. 
This new version considers a parallel supply chain interaction network in 
which two customers, two retailers, one distribution center, two 
manufacturers, and three vendors interact. According to the author, the 
adoption of this teaching tool is highly effective in helping students 
understand the complexity and dynamics of parallel supply chains, identify 
the operational issues, and examine the potential tactical and strategic 
solutions. In fact, the new game helps introduce and facilitate discussions 
about topics such as speculation/postponement, risk-pooling, control 
systems, and technology in supply chain integration. 
This paper aims to contribute to the body of knowledge on decision 
making for supply chain management by introducing new versions of the 
existing simulation tools that embed aspects relevant to virtual enterprises. 
In particular, the VirtuE model has been taken into consideration for 
developing a Beer Game 2.0 and a Beer Game 2.1, the characteristics of 
which will be illustrated together with the simulation results.  
We believe that these evolutions of the Beer Game allow increases in 
the player’s understanding of the strategies that underlie managers’ decision 
making. Our assumption is that the study of players’ policies and behaviors 
is particularly relevant in the presence of multiple suppliers and transaction 
risk. 
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In the next sections, we first introduce our research method, then 
describe the main characteristics of each version of the Beer Game in terms 
of rules, objectives, and simulation results. A short discussion and a 
comparative analysis focused on costs and policies will follow. Finally, we 
summarize the findings by providing comments on the limitation of this 
approach and possible further developments. 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study is based on the results of a series of experiments conducted 
during the Expert Training Course (ETC) in “collaborative management of 
the supply chain” which has been organized in the context of a national 
research project called SFIDA PMI
c.
 The ETC has a special focus on 
interoperability issues and critical relationships among companies in many 
productive sectors. We tested the standard version of the MIT Beer Game, 
and our results were in line with previous findings. We also designed three 
alternative versions of this simulation game in order to highlight the specific 
features of modern supply chains such as the network enterprise structure 
and the possibility of transaction failures. We analyzed the policies 
underlying the behavior of players involved in supply chains and networks 
through simulations. These simulations also led us to obtain a proof of 
concept of the new versions of the Beer Game that are now available for 
further investigations about the cooperation dynamics of the supply network 
participants. 
During the simulations, players were supposed to make their choices 
independently from any given policy and with the goal of reducing their 
own stock costs. In order to compare their strategies
23
 and their willingness 
to take risks, we defined the following policy matrix based on two variables: 
unsold stock and placed order. 
Four possible strategies have been identified depending on the level of 
the two variables: Never Backlog, Full Warehouse, Low Cost, and Pass 
Order. We will refer to these definitions for discussing and classifying 
player behaviors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
c
 More information on the SFIDA PMI project is available on the website (www.cersi.it) of 
the Research Centre on Information Systems - LUISS Guido Carli University, Roma, Italy.  
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Table 1. Strategies identified in beer game simulation 
 UNSOLD STOCK 
 HIGH LOW 
P
L
A
C
E
D
 O
R
D
E
R
S
 
H
IG
H
 
NEVER BACKLOG 
Condition: variable demand 
Target: executing orders 
Risk: collapse or decrease in 
demand generates high storage 
costs 
FULL WAREHOUSE 
Condition: predicting an 
increase in demand 
Target: increasing stock levels 
to avoid backlogs 
Risk: oversized warehouse 
L
O
W
 
LOW COST 
Condition: warehouse is able 
to respond to positive changes 
in demand 
Target: stable inventories with 
predictable costs 
Risk: balanced 
PASS ORDER 
Condition: constant demand 
Target: low warehouse costs 
Risk: risk of backlog due to a 
variable demand increase and 
delays in good delivery 
 
3. BEER GAME 1.0 
3.1 Description 
On the basis of the studies on virtual enterprises, transaction costs, and 
risk management, we defined three versions of the MIT Beer Game in order 
to analyze the policies that affect the supply chain actors’ behavior. The first 
version (also referred to as “Beer Game 1.0”) is very similar to the original 
version in terms of chain structure. It differs only in the shape of the market 
requests since we applied random orders ranging in a 0–10 set of values 
corresponding to 44 cards taken from a deck. The motivation for this choice 
lies in the fact that our goal differs from the traditional MIT Beer Game, 
which is mainly focused on the concept of bullwhip effect. We prefer to 
analyze the simulation results in a random market request scenario. 
The game has four players with the following roles: retailer, wholesaler, 
distributor, and factory. All of them are on the same linear chain. 
The retailer receives a beer order from the final consumer (card deck), 
hiding it from the other players; then, according to his/her personal policy, 
the retailer forwards an order to the wholesaler. The wholesaler sends the 
order to the distributor, and when the order reaches the factory, the last 
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player decides how many beers to produce. Each step has a 2-week lead 
time for both goods and information. The quality of each single policy 
undertaken by the players is assessed on the basis of stock cost values. In 
other terms, players share the common goal of reducing their own stock 
costs and are free to define a personal policy according to their 
understanding of the situation and their personal attitude toward risk. 
In order to support data collection and analysis, each player uses an 
electronic spreadsheet, which includes data related to sent and received 
orders and goods. 
3.2 Simulation 
In this simulation, the bullwhip effect is not as clear as in the original 
simulation because, at the beginning of the game, players try to increase 
their inventories and thus the related costs. In this case, backlog events are 
briefer than the original simulation, which is the most important element of 
the bullwhip effect. This is mainly due to the demand faced by the players, 
which is different from in the MIT Beer Game. This has a stable value at the 
beginning of the game, then an instant positive change that leads to a new 
constant higher value for the rest of the game. This step increase inevitably 
leads players to backlogs. 
In Beer Game 1.0, we explored the case of the stochastic demand, 
where demand was randomly generated from a known distribution, e.g., 
uniformly distributed between a set of values ranging from 0 to 10. At first, 
players increased stock levels to avoid backlog events. Then, they tried to 
estimate the variation range production chain. The cost analysis of the first 
simulation shows very similar levels to those in the MIT Beer Game costs 
(higher in players farthest from the final market). 
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Figure 1. Beer game 1.0 player’s costs 
The only significant differences noted were in the costs of the final 
retailer (higher in comparison to the two middlemen, i.e., equal to 5.508). 
This can be explained as follows: using a Never Backlog strategy and 
knowing the variation of the final demand and the decrease of the goods 
required by the market, the distributor employs an initial strategy aimed at 
increasing warehouse levels during the first weeks and then maintaining a 
constant request equal to the average expected level (equal to 5). In the 
original game, goods required by the market had a constant value equal to 8; 
in the simulation, the average value was approximately 4.75. Despite taking 
into account the producer’s total costs (reaching the value of 11.952), the 
lack of bullwhip effect caused many difficulties for selling warehouse stock. 
As to the middlemen, the wholesaler provides interesting insights: He 
adopted the Just in Time model but, due to the delay of orders and delivery 
of goods (leading to a 4-week postponement), he was not able to avoid an 
oversized warehouse or backlog events. However, he managed to have the 
lowest cost (equal to 2.376). 
4. BEER GAME 2.0 
4.1 Description 
In this version of the game, Beer Game 2.0, we introduced some 
differences in comparison to the previous version. First, players are not in 
the same linear chain. Starting from the retailer, a new diagram is created, 
and the two middlemen are placed on parallel lines. Second, the retailer can 
choose to send the orders to both wholesalers or only to one of them. Finally, 
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the factory manager, on the basis of his own policy and stock levels, can 
choose how many orders to manage. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Beer game 2.0 supply network 
In this simulation, we used another spreadsheet and, unlike the 
previous version (1.0), it is customized to each player. First, the orders 
placed by the two wholesalers are separated and distinguished. Second, the 
factory manager can choose which order to deal with on the basis of his/her 
personal policy. Third, the retailer dashboard is used to register the beers 
received by the two different wholesalers, their incoming orders, and orders 
placed.  
4.2 Simulation 
The second simulation provided interesting results. The players’ total 
costs are proportional to the levels achieved in simulation Beer Game 1.0 
(the factory is the player with the highest cost, followed by the retailer who 
adopted the same strategy and finally the two wholesalers). The sum of the 
wholesalers’ total costs is equal to the retailer’s cost during this simulation 
(after 44 weeks, the retailer scored 14.712, and both wholesalers scored 
14.574). 
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Figure 3. Beer game 2.0 player’s costs 
The factory generally has the highest costs (17.490) because it is the 
player farthest from the market and the information relating to the demand. 
The sum of the two wholesalers’ costs is very similar to the retailer’s cost. 
From this perspective, the retailer has high costs due to the implementation 
of a Full Warehouse strategy, which is not the most suitable strategy in a 
market with such a low variability. 
5. BEER GAME 2.1 
5.1 Description 
In comparison to the previous version, Beer Game 2.1 takes risk 
management into account. The two wholesalers might not be able to receive 
the goods sent by the factory. In that case, they can transfer the beers 
available in stock and try to fulfill the new orders. The other players do not 
know how many times this could happen. This variable is predetermined: 
The high-risk wholesaler has higher probability to fail (P=0.5) and lower 
backlog costs: 
Cr = C * (1-P) 
The low-risk wholesaler has a lower probability to fail (P=0.16) and 
higher backlog costs.  
In particular: 
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 The high-risk wholesaler pays 3 euros per week for each beer crate in 
the warehouse and 6 euros for each backlog order. 
 The low-risk wholesaler pays 5 euros per week for each beer crate in 
the warehouse and 10 euros for each backlog order. 
 The retailer does not know which of the wholesalers poses the greatest 
risk, but he can try to implement policies to find this out (for example, 
by estimating failed orders). 
5.2 Simulation 
Analyzing the total costs of simulation Beer Game 2.1, we observed 
that the factory has the highest costs (28.752) as well as in other 
simulations. The two wholesalers adopted different strategies; the low-risk 
wholesaler adopted the Low Cost strategy, allowing him to successfully 
meet the changes in demand, while the high-risk player, much inclined to 
take risks, adopted the Pass Order strategy to reduce the inventory’s cost. 
Nevertheless, the wholesalers’ costs were lower in comparison to the 
retailer’s. The total of their cost (i.e., 10.348) is less than the cost of the 
retailer (i.e., 11.430) because the high-risk wholesaler maintained a Pass 
Order strategy.  
Figure 4. Beer Game 2.1 player’s cost 
6. DISCUSSION 
The results of the three simulations can be analyzed from two different 
perspectives: (i) the policies implemented by each player and (ii) the 
warehouse and backlog costs. From a methodological point of view, each 
player was asked to review data collected on his behavior and to describe 
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the strategy adopted. As to the cost analysis, data collected on each 
dashboard were compared. 
6.1 Policies 
The policies implemented by the players can be summed up as follows: 
 BEER GAME 1.0 
Factory: On the basis of the first orders, the factory tries to create a 
warehouse able to meet the market demand, avoid backlogs, and, 
afterwards, set up a strategy aimed at reducing stock levels (Never 
Backlog strategy). 
Wholesaler no. 1: Wholesaler no. 1 first implements the “Never 
Backlog” strategy, aiming at stock levels able to successfully meet the 
estimated maximum market demand (10); then, once he has reached 
stock levels equal to 10, he starts sending orders to wholesaler no. 2 
equal to the orders received by the distributor (Pass Order strategy). 
Wholesaler no. 2: Wholesaler no. 2 uses a balanced strategy in order 
to have a low-cost warehouse and, at the same time, meet the market 
demand and avoid backlogs (Full Warehouse). 
Retailer: On the basis of the first orders, the retailer tries to create a 
warehouse able to meet the market demand and, afterwards, set up a 
strategy aimed at reducing stock levels. 
 BEER GAME 2.0 
Factory: By adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude toward risk, 
the factory aims at unsold stock levels capable of satisfying demand 
from the two middlemen without running the risk of building up a 
backlog. 
Wholesaler no. 1: By adopting a balanced strategy, wholesaler no. 1 
aims to keep stocks not particularly high but always capable of serving 
orders, minimizing costs, and avoiding backlogs. 
Wholesaler no. 2: By adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude 
toward risk, wholesaler no. 2 aims at enough stock levels to avoid 
building up a backlog and deal with new orders.  
Retailer: By adopting a strategy with a cautious attitude to risk, the 
retailer first aims at a warehouse able to meet the market demand 
without running the risk of building up a backlog; then, he tries to 
slowly reduce unsold stock. 
 BEER GAME 2.1 
Factory: At first, the factory aims at creating a warehouse able to meet 
the demand of the two middlemen, both of whom are risk subjects. 
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Then, the factory assesses the most-suitable strategies to reduce unsold 
stock. 
High-risk wholesaler: At first, the high-risk wholesaler aims at 
keeping the warehouse at initial levels and then, on the basis of orders 
received, aims at reducing stock levels and meeting orders received. 
Low-risk wholesaler: Aware of playing the role of the “low-risk” 
middlemen, his main aim is keeping the lowest unsold stock levels. 
Retailer: The retailer places substantial orders to both wholesalers 
aiming at creating a warehouse able to face demand variations and, 
later on during the game, identifying the riskiest wholesaler in order to 
reduce stock levels and costs. 
Table 2. Policies of players during the simulations 
 Beer Game 1.0 Beer Game 2.0 Beer Game 2.1 
Factory Never backlog Never backlog Full warehouse 
Wholesaler no. 1 
(high risk) 
Pass order Low cost Low cost 
Wholesaler no. 2 Full warehouse Never backlog Pass order 
Retailer Full warehouse Full warehouse Never backlog 
 
According to the policies described in the above-mentioned matrix and 
the player’s descriptions after the simulations, it is possible to identify two 
main opposite policies in warehouse management: Never Backlog and Pass 
Order. In the first policy, players try to foresee customer demand and be 
always able to satisfy that request. A negative demand variation (near to 
zero) leads to high stock levels and higher costs that they are not able to 
reduce.  
In the Pass Order policy, the player shows a greater willingness to take 
risks, as demonstrated by the intention of keeping low stock levels to reduce 
costs. Delays in goods delivery are common to all players; they have a 
negative impact on their choice and often lead players to backlog events. 
Simulations highlight how players were led to make choices on the basis of 
these two main policies, trying to fill their warehouse or reduce costs and 
showing higher or lower willingness to take risks. 
6.2 Costs 
During the three Beer Game simulations, we observed that the costs of 
each player reflected the results of the MIT Beer Game simulation; the 
player farthest from the market always has higher costs. With the exception 
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of the retailer costs (which are always higher in comparison to the 
wholesaler’s in the three simulations), the factory suffers from higher costs 
due to the total absorption of market demand by the players. This resulted in 
no supply demand by the wholesalers and the factory’s inability to clear 
unsold stock. 
Table 3. Comparison among cost trends in the three simulations 
 Beer Game 1.0 Beer Game 2.0 Beer Game 2.1 
Factory 11952 17490 28752 
Both wholesalers 6384 14574 10348 
Retailer 5508 14712 11430 
 
A comparison among the cost trends in the three simulations is 
extremely interesting. A significant cost increase can be observed between 
Beer Game 1.0 and Beer Game 2.0 due to an insufficient market demand 
towards the supply chain (this also led to no player demand and stagnation 
of goods in most warehouses). During simulation Beer Game 2.1, the two 
wholesalers were given different costs on the basis of their attitude towards 
risk. For this reason, they enjoyed lower costs in comparison to the retailer 
and made their supply chain more cost efficient. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Following an introduction to the MIT Beer Game, the characteristics of 
two new versions of the simulation tool were presented that take into 
account virtual enterprise variables. A series of simulations was carried out 
on the three versions of the tool, and the results were comparatively 
analyzed. Finally, through the analysis of simulation data and a focus group 
with the players, we were able to outline their policies.  
Both the MIT Beer Game and its evolutions share a number of 
limitations that can be the basis for further research in this domain. The 
structural complexity of virtual enterprises is not reflected in the topology of 
the new versions of the Beer Game, which is still based on two parallel lines. 
This choice allowed creation of simple tools that do not need the support of 
an IT platform for running the simulation. The effectiveness of this 
approach needs to be demonstrated by assessing the learning objectives 
achieved by a group of users playing with different versions of the Beer 
Game. Finally, the three simulations were carried out by the same group of 
students from the LUISS ETC course. Therefore, data may be affected from 
some bias due to the learning processes of students. Possible directions to 
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further develop the empirical part of this work are related to the i) collection 
of more data and (ii) simulation of a supply chain where information is 
suddenly available for each player without having a slow information flow 
as it happens with goods delays. In this case, we expect that players will 
easily adopt a low-cost policy, able to rely on a strongly integrated supply 
chain. 
This study offers two main contributions. First, it increases 
understanding of the complexity of managing decision making in supply 
chains and networks. Indeed, Never Backlog, Full Warehouse, Low Cost, 
and Pass Order options emerged as policies adopted by the players. These 
policies were analyzed with respect to their relationship with the structure of 
the supply chain. The second contribution is related to simulation studies
24
 
and the availability of a new teaching tool
25
 to show students the different 
implications of a supply chain that takes into account topology, transaction 
costs, and risks. The feedback collected from the participants demonstrated 
that by using this simulation tool, it is possible to critically analyze the 
decision making process and understand the foundation of the policies 
adopted by the managers.  
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